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DIGITAL SUBORDINATION OR SOVEREIGNTY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIGITAL POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRAZIL AND CHINA IN THE FACE OF THE HEGEMONY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

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Introductory Statement

The panel discusses the responses of the European Union, Brazil, and China to the hegemony of the United States in the so-called digital economy, based on data and the operation of digital platforms. The aim is to describe and analyze these three cases about the US paradigm, problematizing the countries' digital sovereignty in the current situation. Methodologically, the comparative analysis is based on an extensive review of the theoretical literature and case studies relating to each object, using, among other elements, document studies. It discusses how the so-called new economy is part of the latest global system of culture - an idea similar to that of the mode of regulation, with an emphasis on the articulation between material culture and spiritual culture - currently disputed by the United States and China.

The panel points out that the US model, based on deregulation and the consolidation of private monopolies, has molded the global architecture of the internet and imposed a mercantile paradigm of governance, deeply linked to the speculative dynamics of capitalism under financial dominance, as will be detailed in the first contribution. The second will detail how the US project emerged victorious, going through the dispute between the technological trajectory of digital and telecommunications, the implications

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of which go beyond the battles over the organization of communication systems, becoming part of the struggle for socio-economic, geopolitical, and cultural hegemony. With the privatization of the internet and the centralization of capital after the dot.com crisis - which resulted in the formation of the current oligopoly of digital platforms - the new cultural system will appear, despite its unitary, globalized character and coherence with the current financial logic, to be tripartite. This is generally represented by layers: infrastructure, applications, and content. This division is useful for analyzing the position of countries, as few have trunk platforms (van Dijck, 2022), which makes the rest dependent.

Faced with all the changes that have shaped the digital economy, the third contribution will analyze how Europe ended up in a position of subordination, unlike in the previous period, when European countries were gaining competition in cutting-edge industrial sectors, such as the automobile industry. This was the result, according to Nieminen, Padovani, and Sousa (2023), of a long history of public disinvestment, privatizations, deregulation, and, on the other hand, the advance of US companies in the wake of the globalization of capital. Nevertheless, the European Union has guided the so-called information society, then the knowledge society, and now the digital transition as programs associated with a possible relaunch, which has not been successful.

China, on the other hand, has opted for a model of active digital sovereignty. The state has managed to develop a strategic vision of science and technology and, based on this, through different phases that will be detailed in the penultimate contribution, it has responded by creating its technological infrastructures and strengthening national companies that offer alternatives to large US corporations, configuring a model of digital autonomy. The Medium and Long Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (MLP) was launched in 2006 based on a broad debate on technological dependence, emphasizing the importance of endogenous innovation and the integration of science and technology development strategies with industrial policies. The 2008 global financial crisis helped accelerate this integration with the launch of Strategic Emerging Industries (SIC) in 2010. With Xi Jinping in power, in 2015 the Made in China 2025 plan was launched, covering the ten key sectors for development in the immediate future, as well as the document Guiding Opinions of the State Council for Vigorously Advancing Internet Plus Actions. In 2016, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy and, in 2017, it was the turn of the National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP). In short, the proposals will result in the establishment of a particular type of relationship between the state and the platforms, as well as competition between them (WANG, Xiaoyan 2017).

Finally, the panel will discuss the case of Brazil. Its recent trajectory, associated with the privatization of telecommunications, has shaped a scenario of technological dependence, where there is not even an understanding of the strategic role of digital technologies, which can be seen in the proliferation of policies that are still poorly articulated within the federal government, and the difficulty of regulating digital platforms from the National Congress. In a context of growing global concern about digital sovereignty, we are discussing the need for regulation that goes beyond merely

mitigating the effects of platform dominance and explores alternative ways of strengthening digital sovereignty and development - understood, in the manner of Furtado (1967), as a creative process, based on tradition, of opening up horizons, by the goals proposed by the community and periodically renewed.

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DATA ECONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVELOPMENT

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This panel presentation aims to present key elements for criticizing the idea of a new ‘data economy’, which is supposed to differ from the mode of regulation dominated by finance (Chesnais 1996). In the current context, which is the consequence of policies to deal with the structural crisis of the 1970s, two general aspects should be considered.

From the point of view of the real economy, capitalist restructuring, based on the development of productive forces whose genesis dates back to the Second World War and the post-war period (Noble 1977), in particular with the so-called microelectronic revolution, has resulted in the constitution of the digital paradigm and an extensive transformation of production processes. This phenomenon is taking place under the influence of a broad movement towards the subsumption of intellectual labor and the general intellectualization of all work processes, generating crucial impacts on consumption and sociability. In Marxist terms, this process can be defined as the Third Industrial Revolution (Bolaño 2002). Telematics convergence, the internet, digital platforms, and so-called artificial intelligence, among countless other socio-technical

innovations that have emerged over the last five decades, are offshoots of this same revolutionary process.

The second aspect to be considered is the well-known detachment between the real and financial orbits of capital, resulting in a mass of ‘idle capital’ (Marx 2017), which moves freely around the world, promoting greater centralization of capital and generating recurrent crises (Belluzzo 2009; Guillén, 2015; Sá Barreto 2019). The advance of neoliberalism is closely linked to the development of information technologies, since ‘platforms not only accompany the neoliberal process of deregulating institutional labor and employment norms but also deepen it and give it new tools’ (Cingolani 2022, p. 3).

Based on this theoretical-historical perspective, two issues should be considered when discussing the so-called data economy. On the one hand, it is a development linked to the Third Industrial Revolution, which expands the capacity of digital technical systems to collect, store, and manipulate huge volumes of data. At this point, for methodological reasons, it's only worth reflecting on the strictly economic aspects of the problem, but we mustn't forget the fact that among the uses of the data extracted from populations are the systems of surveillance and social control by agents with economic power (Furtado 1978). This is the ultimate aim of the whole process of creating Big Data: control.

On the other hand, the construction of large databases, where raw materials are stored that can be used in various work processes, gives rise to a market where packages of data are bought and sold. As interest in statistical, demographic, and behavioral data grows - with a view to advertising strategies, political propaganda, and much more, including the famous training of artificial intelligence - the idea of a data economy may seem increasingly appropriate from the perspective of orthodox economics. However, this vision does not refer to an economy based on the production of a specific commodity, but on the exchange of mere abstractions.

Of course, the collection and use of data, facilitated by information and communication technologies, can serve specific purposes and be linked to concrete production processes. For example, in a state-of-the-art industrial plant, such as a car manufacturer, workers, using laptops and wearable devices such as magnified vision goggles and exoskeletons, provide data that helps coordinate work and surveillance, significantly impacting productivity. However, this is not what the supposed data economy takes into account.

Data cannot be defined as a commodity - or even a raw material, contrary to what has become naturalized in the literature (Srnicek 2018) - but rather as raw material. Data collection is becoming increasingly feasible due to the ‘expansion of platform infrastructures in the form of apps, plugins, trackers and active and passive sensors’ (Poell, Nieborg, and van Dijck 2020, p. 4). However, the objectified labor in these digital infrastructures has the sole purpose of capturing data, one could say, separating it from its immediate connection to individuals. According to Marx (1968 p. 203), ‘all things which labor merely separates from their immediate connection with their natural environment constitute objects of labor, provided by nature’. The same can be said of

data, which will only be considered raw material once they have ‘undergone a modification carried out by labor’ (ibid.) or, to put it another way, once they have been filtered, organized, and structured by living labor objectified into infrastructures other than those that perform simple capture (Zanghelini 2024).

To the extent that data is extracted and stored on a large scale by companies that control the repositories, it can be and is packaged to serve the fictitious valorization of capital, with the justification of its subsequent usefulness in concrete processes, such as those linked to the advertising sector, the main source of funding for the companies that own the largest and most obvious digital platforms. This data trade is, in essence, a form of fictitious capital, whose mobilization follows the same logic as the financial innovations that have marked the development of capitalism in the neoliberal period, intensifying the cyclical crises of capital, such as the subprime crisis of 2008 (Carcanholo and Medeiros 2014).

On a more general level, we hypothesize that this type of configuration of the so-called data economy - excluding cases involving productive labor processes, such as the one mentioned above in the example of the car manufacturer, which requires a more detailed and individualized study - does not act to counteract the tendential fall in the average rate of profit. This is because, from the perspective of the totality, this configuration is restricted only to the distribution of socially produced surplus value. This logic points to the general problem we are facing at the moment, when digital networks and platforms have taken on a central role in capitalism's mode of regulation, deepening the tendencies installed since the beginning of the neoliberal period, in the wake of the extension of the commodity form into the most recondite areas of human relations.

In this way, we move to another plane of analysis, where it is no longer a question of whether the supposed data economy involves the production or mere distribution of socially produced value and wealth, a question already mentioned above, nor of pointing out, as we have already done, its character as the fictitious valorization of capital. The question now is that of development policies and economic planning, whether the models adopted in different countries form a development strategy aimed at meeting the urgent needs of the national population (Gadelha 2021), in line with Furtado's perspective of reversing the logic of the transmutation of means into ends, characteristic of capitalism, or not. From this general framework, the panel will go on to detail how different countries or blocs have dealt with the digital economy in its current phase.

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DEREGULATION AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE U.S. PARADIGM OF THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY

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The U.S. model, based on deregulation and the consolidation of private monopolies, has shaped the global architecture of the internet and imposed a market-driven paradigm of digital governance. Since the 1990s, the U.S. project has prevailed, with

implications that extend beyond the organization of industries and communication systems, positioning itself within the broader struggle for socioeconomic, geopolitical, and cultural hegemony. With the privatization of the internet in 1995 and the capital centralization following the dot-com crisis of 2000—which resulted in the formation of the current oligopoly of platform-owning corporations—this new global cultural system emerged as unitary and globalized, aligned with the financial logic of contemporary capitalism (Srnicek, 2018; Wu, 2018).

The emergence of platform-owning corporations and their rise to the status of global monopolies is also a consequence of major global trends in media policy, particularly the widespread push for communication deregulation, which can be traced back to the United States in the 1980s (Flew, Martin & Suzor, 2019, p. 38).

One of the dominant perspectives at the time suggested that the internet should be regarded as distinct from "old media," such as print publishing and broadcasting. Eli Noam (2009, p. 273) observed that “even when the Internet became commercialized, it was often asserted that the economy of bits operated under fundamentally different principles than the economy of atoms.”

Starting in the 1990s, the U.S. government adopted a non-interventionist approach to internet regulation, allowing the private sector to establish itself as the primary agent in managing digital infrastructure. A key milestone in this process was the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, particularly Section 230, which granted legal immunity to digital platforms for content published by their users, thereby cementing their role as intermediaries without editorial responsibility (Mueller, 2015, p. 39).

This regulatory framework was essential for the expansion of major digital platforms, as it enabled them to operate without the restrictions imposed on traditional media outlets. The internet was developed under a logic of freedom and regulatory absence, leading to the widespread belief in its "ungovernability" (Lessig, 1998).

As Cofreces (2024) observes, the primacy of the market over state regulation has been a central principle in U.S. digital policy, allowing technology companies to operate with broad freedom in data exploitation and the structuring of digital markets (Couldry & Mejias, 2019).

The notion that market competition alone would be sufficient to regulate the digital economy largely justified the state’s inertia in response to monopoly accusations and abuses of dominant market positions. Deregulation, legal protections for digital platforms, and the absence of policies for the development of local platforms facilitated the consolidation of technological U.S. giants such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (Schaake, 2024; Srnicek, 2018).

From a geopolitical perspective, as Anu Bradford (2024) points out, "deep-rooted concern remains that a more regulated digital economy would force the United States to relinquish its role as a technological leader, leaving the country without many beneficial innovations and ceding to China’s supremacy in the unfolding tech race" (2024, p. 6).

Indeed, one of the main public arguments used by major technology companies to oppose any form of regulation is the alleged incompatibility between regulation and innovation, the idea that the former could harm or slow down the latter, thereby undermining the competitiveness of U.S. firms. This concern is particularly salient in the context of hegemonic competition with China.

This laissez-faire approach toward technology companies, under the pretext of stimulating innovation, has been widely debunked in the specialized literature. However, the United States actively disseminates this narrative, particularly among its allied countries (Bradford, 2024; Schaake, 2024).

The regulation of digital platforms in the United States has historically been fragmented across multiple regulatory agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This regulatory fragmentation, combined with the strong lobbying power of the technology industry, has hindered the implementation of effective economic regulation of platforms (Wu, 2018).

This remains the case even after 2016, when the Cambridge Analytica scandal involving Facebook triggered a series of high-profile political and public debates, marking the end of the so-called innocence surrounding these technology companies. Despite the increasing scrutiny from the U.S. Congress, where top executives of major platforms were summoned for hearings, these developments did not lead to significant regulatory changes.

Although the U.S. commitment to free-market principles has remained consistent across different administrations, both Democratic and Republican, in recent years—particularly since the Biden administration (2021–2024)—some regulatory initiatives have emerged in response to the growing power of Big Tech.

Among these, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (2021) stands out, aiming to restrict anticompetitive practices and limit the market power of dominant platforms (Khan, 2018). Additionally, the Biden administration has promoted a more interventionist approach, introducing new guidelines on mergers and acquisitions and pursuing antitrust lawsuits against Google, Amazon, and Facebook. However, despite some of these initiatives being bipartisan, they face strong resistance within Congress and from the broader U.S. political structure.

Since the late 19th century, the United States began developing a complex framework of antitrust regulations, aiming to foster more competitive ecosystems and markets. However, the implementation of these laws has been uneven throughout history. While at times they have served as tools to resolve landmark antitrust cases, such as Standard Oil and AT&T, even enforcing structural remedies like divestment, at other times they have been reinterpreted through a neoliberal lens, narrowed in scope, or entirely disregarded (Lynn, 2010 & 2024).

Some authors argue that "the market regulatory framework, in particular antitrust regulation, favors the growth of large companies instead of competition between producers that is a nominal modus operandi of capitalist economies" (Bilić & Prug,

2021, p. 6). In the platform market, antitrust doctrine, in its most reductionist interpretation, appears ineffective. As these authors state, "absence of prices for consumed outputs poses a problem for regulators. Antitrust regulations and interpretations are anchored in the idea that competition leads to lowering of prices, which through cheaper products leads to higher consumer welfare" (Ibidem, p. 81). From this perspective, monopoly is not merely a stage in capitalist development but rather a dynamic process shaped and constrained by a specific regulatory regime.

The American model, however, has been increasingly challenged both domestically and internationally, particularly due to the perception that Big Tech's monopolistic practices and the political influence these corporations exert to block stricter regulations are detrimental not only to the economy but also to the functioning of democratic institutions and public debate in broader terms (Khan, 2018).

The discussion proposed in this presentation aims to analyze the dilemmas of platform regulation in the United States, exploring the advances and limitations of recent regulatory efforts. It is argued that, despite some more assertive initiatives, regulation in the U.S. remains constrained by strong corporate lobbying and the fragmentation of the regulatory framework, preventing effective measures to curb market concentration and foster fairer competition (Wu, 2018). Thus, this study contributes to the debate on digital governance by comparing the challenges faced by the United States with the models adopted in the European Union, Brazil, and China.

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IS THE EUROPEAN UNION STRIKING BACK? AN ANALYSIS OF "DIGITAL TRANSITION" POLICIES

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Faced with all the changes that have molded the digital economy, Europe has ended up in a position of subordination, unlike in the previous period, when European countries were winning the competition in cutting-edge industrial sectors such as automobiles. There have indeed been attempts to consolidate their standards in information and communication technologies. For example, in the 1970s, the European Informatics Network (EIN) was formed, but the initiative ran up against the lack of technical standardization (Nieminen, Padovani, Sousa 2023). From the 1980s onwards, these technologies took center stage in the development of programs at the European level (Juhász 2008) - as seen in the creation by the Council of Ministers of the Common Market of a pilot program in 1978, which in France generated the Minitel system in 1982, which connected telephone subscribers to a network of videotext services[1], but which lost ground in the face of the victory of the standard associated with telematics. The consolidation of the restructuring project under the command of the United States is

[1] On this important experience, see: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18610692. Accessed on: May 20, 2024.

illustrated by the fact, explained by Husson (1999), that both Philips and Siemens gave up chip production in favor of the US company IBM. He concludes that the globalization of competition has been faster than the integration of the European Union itself. For Carchedi (2018), the European Union has emerged in this context as more of a 'union of states', a space where they seek to negotiate with each other.

Despite these contradictions, technologies were presented as central to the 'relaunch of Europe'. The 1994 Delors Commission White Paper[2], which projected the idea of the 'information society', proposed the creation of information motorways (broadband networks) and the development of services and applications associated with them, based on a partnership between the public and private sectors. The creation of these networks would require the removal of regulatory and financial 'obstacles', the mobilization of private investors, and the identification of transport and energy projects. In exchange for investments and knowledge between countries, the market would open up, and 'flexible' jobs would be created.

Despite promises of a return to growth in recent decades, both the profit rate and the industrial production index in the EU have fallen, albeit with fluctuations (Alves 2020). According to Pordata, the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has also fallen, from 1.8 percent in 1996 to 0.4 percent in 2023[3]. In the case of productivity, it grew slowly between 1995 and 2023, but with differences between the bloc's countries[4]. The European Commission recognizes that 'since the mid-1990s, average productivity growth in the EU has been lower than in other major economies, leading to a growing gap in productivity levels'[5].

As for digital platforms, according to the Commission[6], less than 4 percent of the main ones in 2021 were European; local microcircuits accounted for less than 10 percent of the European market; and 90 percent of EU data was managed by US companies. In general, relevant European corporations operate at the application layer, such as Spotify and Booking. It is also worth mentioning Nokia and Siemens, the former important in the field of telecommunications infrastructure and 5G network technologies,

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[2] The book exposed commitments made among European countries under the framework of "Crescimento, Competitividade, Emprego: os Desafios e os Caminhos para Entrar no Século XXI" the original title of the document. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/pt/publication-detail/-/publication/0d563bc1-f17e-48ab-bb2a-9dd9a31d5004. Accessed on: May 20, 2024.

[3] Pordata is the statistical portal of the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation. Its data sources include Eurostat, National Institutes of Statistics, and Annual National Accounts. Available at: https://www.pordata.pt/db/europa/ambiente+de+consulta/tabela. Accessed on: June 5, 2024.

[4] Among the most productive countries are Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Finland, and France. The least productive include Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Lithuania.

[5] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0168#footnoteref4. Accessed on: July 6, 2024.

[6] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0118#footnote10. Accessed on: May 15, 2024.

the latter even more diversified, with growing relevance in software for industries[7]. These are, however, isolated cases and hark back to an earlier period of technological development. Despite these results and the European Commission's acknowledgment that it is lagging in cutting-edge technologies such as AI[8], the European institutions continue to point to the so-called ‘digital transition’ as central to a possible revival. This movement expresses the need for autonomy from other countries, such as the United States.

To reposition itself in the digital economy, a first action was the Digital Single Market strategy of 2015, considered by Nieminen, Padovani, and Sousa (2023 p. 13) as ‘the EU's most ambitious attempt to respond to the challenge of the United States and Japan, as well as rising China in digitalization’. The strategy was ‘followed by the emergence of a more geopolitical and protectionist European agenda at the end of the last decade’ (Bonnamy, Perarnaud 2024, p. 13). The panel will discuss documents that present the EU's position and policies for the digital transition, namely: ‘Digital Strategy: Shaping Europe's Digital Future’, launched at the beginning of 2020, and ‘Digital Compass 2030: The European Way for the Digital Decade’, from 2021.

To summarise, these guidelines have led to the implementation of measures such as the end of roaming charges; the regulation of data protection; the cross-border portability of online content; and the unblocking of e-commerce. As Perarnaud (2024, p. 4) analyses, ‘although it is difficult to characterize the EU's approach to digital sovereignty, it is generally described as an attempt by the EU to regain control over the digital field and develop international leadership capacity’, which implies betting on its initiatives in terms of infrastructure, applications, and protocols.

Own rules are also seen as necessary for the EU to be a strong digital player, reducing dependency and influencing digital solutions on a global scale. These proposals were translated into the regulations on digital services and digital markets (Digital Service Act and Digital Market Act, DSA and DMA), presented in 2020 and approved in 2022, important for proposing measures about the provision of services and competition and also for inspiring legislation in other countries, the so-called Brussels Effect (Bradford 2020). In the case of competition, the measures set out in the DMA are aimed, on the one hand, at limiting anti-competitive practices such as self-preferencing and data bundling; on the other hand, they seek to guarantee the expansion of the offer of other products and services and user choice.

The EU case, by way of conclusion, points out that the self-regulation that predominated in the approach to the Internet was weakened by the intensification of competition between countries and the perception of problems involving digital platforms, which led several States to establish their own rules. Given the structural difficulties, resulting from Europe's history in the sector and the current economic problems, the European Union's

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[7] In 2023, it recorded a historic free cash flow, totaling 10 billion euros. Available at: https://press.siemens.com/pt/pt/comunicadodeimprensa/final-poderoso-para-ano-fiscal-recorde. Accessed on: June 18, 2024.

[8] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0168#footnoteref4. Accessed on: July 6, 2024.

platform regulation policy seeks, first and foremost, to reposition itself in the competition between countries. To this end, it seeks to standardize its market through legislation, while seeking to influence other countries and their agents. In doing so, it strengthens the perspective of platform regulation from the State, which means a change in the organization of the Internet. However, in the case of the European Union, its presence in the digital economy is marked by a history of public disinvestment, privatizations, and deregulation, a situation that has harmed it in terms of competition (Nieminen, Padovani, Sousa 2023). Without modifying these structural elements, it seeks to establish a single market and guarantee the presence of its companies, but it does not resolve the issue of sovereignty and its development.

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CHINA: AN AUTONOMOUS PATH IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT

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With the end of the Soviet Union, US dominance over the international order became almost absolute. However, the emergence of China as a major population, economic, technological and military power placed a new limit on the capacity for domination and expansion of the neoliberal ideas exported by the US. In addition to defending itself from the US political and economic model, China was able to present its own development model that allowed it, among other factors, to prosper economically, develop scientifically and technologically and, above all, assert its sovereignty.

China has always been clear that advances in science and technology would be essential to overcoming the backwardness to which the country was subjected for almost the entire 20th century. Regarding the development of productive forces, taking into account the most recent period, the Chinese challenge, as Hiratuka and Diegues (2025, p. 2) summarize, was to ensure a cachet strategy via innovation systems comprising “business and non-business actors and institutions that contribute to learning and the accumulation of capabilities”, which becomes more complex as “the possibilities of assimilation, imitation and adaptation of technologies from leading countries are completed. The next step involves the development of new capabilities to go beyond mere imitation”.

More recent projects, initiated with Deng Xiaoping's four modernizations, continued in the 1990s with specific actions in the science and technology sector:

> If in the 1980s Township and Villages Enterprises (TVE) played an extremely important role in generating added value and industrial employment, changes in the 1990s gave rise to a more diversified business landscape, with state-owned enterprises remaining in strategic sectors such as infrastructure and capital-intensive heavy industry, while a frontier set of private companies assumed a more prominent role (...). Foreign direct investment gained strength and China was embraced in the productive fragmentation and outsourcing of manufacturing within global value chains, consolidating itself as a major producer and exporter of manufactured goods. The policy of negotiating access to the local market in exchange for technology transfer initiated in the 1980s gained new momentum in the 1990s (Hiratuka, Diegues 2025, p. 4).

When the Internet boom and the advancement of information technologies occurred, China was already aware and economically prepared to follow its path that would allow it to effectively and practically exercise its sovereignty in the digital field as well. Despite these efforts, technological dependence remained. It was after a broad debate on this subject that, in 2006, the Medium and Long Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (MLP) was launched, emphasizing the importance of endogenous innovation and the integration of development strategies in Science and Technology with industrial policies. According to the authors, the global financial crisis of 2008

helped accelerate this integration, with the launch of the Strategic Emerging Industries (SIC) in 2010. With Xi Jinping in power, the Made in China 2025 plan was launched in 2015, covering the ten key sectors for development in the immediate future, as well as the document Guiding Opinions of the State Council for Vigorously Advancing Internet Plus Actions. In 2016, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, and in 2017, the National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP). About digital platforms, the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy advocates that the country should "build a set of infrastructures and platforms that support high-level innovation" and "form a cluster of superior enterprises with recognized outstanding brands, robust service platforms, and first-class quality" (Brancher, Polita 2023, p. 60). The 2015 document on Internet Plus states that "the Internet should be used as a platform for sharing production and life factors, resource allocation should be optimized to the maximum, and the formation of a new economic and social mode based on openness and co-participation should be accelerated" (Brancher, Polita 2023, p. 60).

Jia and Nieborg (2022, p. 3) point out that the large Chinese platforms emerged as internet companies focused on one or a few key segments of the internet industry, acquiring a leadership position from which they undertake diversification strategies by "expanding and integrating with 'sectoral platforms' that include transportation, health and education", which makes it "increasingly difficult to untangle their reach", a challenge compounded by their process of "interplatformization". The panel will detail how this set of plans resulted in a particular type of competition that, although it implies the same processes of general platformization of the economy and infra structuralization of the large trunk platforms in the classification of van Dijck (2022), is guided by a strong coincidence between the objectives of the State's Science and Technology Policy and the interests of the Chinese platforms, which will thus end up becoming the great challenger to the US companies that dominate the sector, leaving all other potential competitors far behind.

On its journey towards 2049, the centenary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, digital sovereignty will be a decisive element for China to achieve its ultimate goal, that is, to become a modern, prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist country. In fact, in the view of Xi Jinping, the main architect of the country's modernization and the nation's revitalization in its current phase, "without cybersecurity, there is no national security, just as without informatization there can be no modernization. To build a strong cyber country, we need to have our own advanced technology; valuable and comprehensive information services, and a thriving cyber culture. We also need a good information infrastructure and a strong information economy, as well as highly qualified cybersecurity and informatization professionals"[9]

Specifically, understanding how China has been building and exercising its sovereignty in the digital field is of fundamental importance, especially for large developing countries like Brazil. Just as China's rise prevented the predominance of a unipolar international order, which would in practice represent a weakening of the idea of a sovereign state,

[9] Speech delivered at the First Meeting of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization. Beijing, February 27, 2014.

Chinese scientific and technological advances related to the area of digital sovereignty can be a decisive counterpoint to the course of humanity itself.

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